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ABSTRACT 
This Article bridges a gap in existing literature by evaluating, from an empirical 
perspective, the impact of conflict among the lower courts on the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant or deny a petition for a writ of certiorari.  Specifically, this Article 
looks at the political ideology of the lower courts involved in a split of authority on 
federal law and compares those positions to the political ideology of the Supreme 
Court itself.  This Article concludes that the ideological content of lower court 
opinions in a conflict case impacts the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions in a 
statistically significant way, and thus sheds new light on the role lower court conflict 
plays in whether the Supreme Court’s exercise of its discretion to grant cert. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long argued that ideological and political considerations affect 
judicial behavior—that judges decide cases based, at least in part, on their own 
personal ideological and partisan preferences rather than solely on application of 
legal principles.1  Considerably less attention has been paid to the existence of an 
ideological basis for how the justices of the United States Supreme Court decide 
which cases to decide.  The question of how the Court decides to decide is of 
tremendous importance, given that it only chooses approximately 1% of the cases 
presented.  The conventional wisdom is that the Court’s decisions on petitions for 
writs of certiorari are made based on a number of variables including, relevant to this 
Article, circuit splits.  But prior research on circuit splits and their effect on the 
Court’s cert decisions has focused predominately on the mere existence of a split of 
authority, rather than on the ideological or partisan divide that the split represents.  
This Article bridges a gap in existing literature by evaluating, from an empirical 
perspective, the impact of political ideology on the Supreme Court’s decision to 
grant cert in cases involving splits of authority among the circuits and concludes that 
political ideology impacts that decision to a greater extent than previously 
recognized. 
During its 2011 term, the Supreme Court considered approximately 8,000 
petitions for a writ of certiorari.2  As the primary (and nearly exclusive) method by 
which the Supreme Court selects the cases it will decide, the writ of certiorari 
reflects the discretionary nature of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.3  The Court is 
not required to hear all cases in which a petition for a writ of certiorari is filed; 
instead, it chooses at its discretion whether to grant or deny the petition.  In recent 
                                                            
 1 Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of 
Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. 99, 102-03 (2010) (“Many hard-core political scientists are 
satisfied to describe judges as nothing more than politicians in robes who do nothing more 
than maximize their policy preferences.”). 
 2 Official data are not yet publicly available. This approximation is based on the number 
of petitions considered by the Court in the prior two terms. The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
411, 413 (2010) (during its 2009 term, the Court considered 8,131 petitions for a writ of 
certiorari); The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2011) [hereinafter Statistics 2011] 
(during its 2010 term, the Court considered 7,868 petitions for a writ of certiorari).  
 3 SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/4
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terms, the Court has granted certiorari and issued a full decision on the merits in less 
than one-hundred cases per term.4 
Among these approximately 8,000 certiorari petitions were numerous petitions 
claiming a conflict in the interpretation of federal law.5  The term “conflict” signals 
that at least two courts have adopted differing legal rules to be applied to the same or 
similar facts.6  Conflict has long been considered one of the primary reasons for 
granting certiorari because conflict “offends the principle that, under one national 
law, people who are similarly situated should be treated similarly.”7  Historically, the 
Court was able to resolve almost all of the conflicts presented to it.8  But, as the 
Court’s caseload has increased over time, its ability to resolve all conflicts has 
diminished.9  Given this workload constraint, how does the Court determine which 
conflicts to address and which to ignore? 
We approach this research question from a policy-based perspective, adopting 
the view that ideological and political considerations affect judicial behavior—that 
judges “decide to decide”10 cases based, at least in part, on their own personal 
ideological and policy preferences rather than solely on the application of legal 
principles.11  We argue that the Court is more likely to grant certiorari in conflict 
cases that reflect a difference of opinion among the lower courts over policy choices.  
While existing research has pointed to the importance of policy considerations in the 
                                                            
 4 See Statistics 2011, supra note 2, at 370 (showing that during its 2010 term, the Court 
issued full, written opinions in eighty cases); see also Adam Liptak, The Case of the 
Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A18.  
 5 In his study of the certiorari process, one scholar found that a conflict was claimed in 
approximately 50% of the certiorari petitions filed with the Court. S. Sidney Ulmer, The 
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 901, 905 (1984).   
 6 Perhaps the most common occurrence of conflict is reflected by the term “circuit 
split”—a conflict between two or more federal courts of appeals.  However, conflict also may 
come in several other forms: (i) conflict between one or more lower federal courts and 
Supreme Court precedent; (ii) conflict between one or more federal courts and one or more 
state courts (usually state supreme courts); (iii) conflict between one or more state courts and 
Supreme Court precedent; and (iv) conflict between two or more state courts (usually state 
supreme courts).  For reasons discussed below, this paper focuses on conflict between two or 
more federal courts of appeals. 
 7 Michael S. Shenberg, Identification, Tolerability, and Resolution of Intercircuit 
Conflicts: Reexamining Professor Feeney’s Study of Conflicts in Federal Law, 59 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1007, 1020-21 (1984).  But see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1567 (2008). 
 8 Robert L. Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV. 465, 465 
(1953). 
 9 Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. MacFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1404-07 (1987). 
 10 See generally H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991). 
 11 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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Court’s certiorari behavior,12 it has not considered how these policy considerations 
play a role in conflict cases.  In studying the role conflict plays in the Court’s 
certiorari decision, the focus has been on the mere existence of the conflict, rather 
than on the ideological divide the conflict may represent. 
Answering our research question is important for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is the implications it raises for the Court’s role in our legal and 
political system.  It has long been argued that one of the main functions of the Court 
is unify the interpretation of federal law.13  But, when the Court fails to address 
conflict, the law remains unclear14 and a better understanding of the Court’s reasons 
for doing so enables scholars, practitioners, and the public at large to understand the 
role the Court sees for itself.  If, for example, the Court’s certiorari decisions in 
conflict cases reflect a concern over policy, it may suggest that the Court views itself 
more as a national policy maker than as a supervisor policing non-uniformity in the 
lower courts. 
What might a “policy conflict” look like?  Consider National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,15 in which the Court resolved a well-publicized 
split among the federal courts of appeals16 on the constitutionality of the individual 
health insurance mandate contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.17  News reports on the decisions from the various federal court judges 
addressing the law highlighted the perceived ideology of these judges in reaching 
their decisions.  Newspapers were quick to identify judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents who upheld the law and judges appointed by Republican presidents who 
overturned the law,18 implying, if not suggesting outright, that the political ideology 
                                                            
 12 See e.g. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The 
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062 (2009). 
 13 Ulmer, supra note 5, at 902 n.3. 
 14 Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1223 (2012).  
 15 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 16 Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding 
mandate), and Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding mandate), with 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (overturning 
mandate). 
 17 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 18 Reporting on the early federal trial court decisions, The New York Times noted: 
The ruling by Judge Vinson, a senior judge who was appointed by President Ronald 
Reagan, solidified the divide in the health litigation among judges named by 
Republicans and those named by Democrats. In December, Judge Henry E. Hudson of 
Federal District Court in Richmond, Va., who was appointed by President George W. 
Bush, became the first to invalidate the insurance mandate. Two other federal judges 
named by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat, have upheld the law. 
Kevin Sack, Federal Judge Rules that Health Law Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2011, at A1.  News reports on the later decisions reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
continued the trend–reporting, for example, on the fact that the Eleventh Circuit had 
overturned the law in an opinion written by a judge appointed by George H.W. Bush.  Michael 
Cooper, Health Law is Dealt Blow by a Court on Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at 
A11. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/4
2012] THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE 563 
 
of the judge, or at least of the president who appointed him or her, explained the 
particular judge’s decision.  This framing of the conflicting opinions in the federal 
courts by the media highlights the ideological divide that we view as representing a 
“policy conflict.” 
This Article offers an initial exploration of the role of policy conflicts in the 
Supreme Court’s certiorari decision.  We do so by comparing the policy implications 
raised by cases involving conflicts among the United States Courts of Appeals in 
which the Supreme Court has either granted or denied certiorari.  Part II begins the 
discussion by describing the relationship between conflict and the petition for writ of 
certiorari.  Part III reviews prior research on certiorari behavior, focusing primarily 
on the role of conflict and policy preferences.  From this review, Part IV suggests a 
different approach to the study of the role of conflict in the Court’s certiorari 
behavior, and using data collected from lower court cases, tests the theory that the 
ideological divide that the conflict represents affects the Court’s decision to hear a 
particular case.  Part V concludes by summarizing the results of this first look, 
acknowledging the limitations of this approach, and suggesting further research to 
test the theory. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The process by which appellate cases make their way to the Supreme Court has 
evolved dramatically over time.  While Article III, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in “one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish,”19 it is Article III, Section 2 that is the genesis of this evolution—an 
evolution that has seen the Court move from mandatory appellate jurisdiction to 
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.  
A.  The Writ of Certiorari and the Development of Discretion 
Article III, Section 2 defines the judicial power—delineating the cases and 
controversies over which the federal courts have jurisdiction.  In addition, section 2 
broadly outlines the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction with respect 
to these cases and controversies and grants to Congress the authority to regulate, and 
make exceptions to, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.20  Congress first exercised its 
Article III powers in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created thirteen district 
courts21 and three circuit courts,22 and defined a six-member Supreme Court.23  The 
                                                            
 19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  “[A]cts of Congress specifying the Court’s [appellate] 
jurisdiction have long been understood as exercises of this power, implicitly excepting all 
cases not specified.” Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-
Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649 (2000). 
 21 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 10, § 2, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 22 Id. at § 4. 
 23 Id. at § 1; see also Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Creating the Federal 
Judicial System, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 4-7 (2005), http://www.fjc.gov 
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/creat3ed.pdf/$File/creat3ed.pdf.  The Court was expanded to seven 
members in 1807, then to nine in 1837, and to ten in 1863, before finally settling at nine with 
the Circuit Judge Act of 1869.  See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS 
OF THE SUPREME COURT 34, 48, 72 (1928). 
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Act conferred upon the Supreme Court original (and, in some cases, exclusive) 
jurisdiction over certain matters,24 as well as appellate jurisdiction over specified 
cases from both the federal and the state courts.25  Appeals to the Supreme Court 
were as of right; the Court had no power to accept or decline any particular case that 
came before it.26  And although the 1789 Act gave the Court the power to issue writs 
of certiorari,27 that power was not a mechanism to assert jurisdiction and “did not 
provide the Supreme Court with discretionary control over its jurisdiction.”28 
Congress’s first grant of discretionary docket control to the Court came over one-
hundred years later with the passage of the Evarts Act of 1891.29  Enacted largely to 
reduce the Supreme Court’s swelling case load,30 the act created nine new circuit 
courts of appeal and transferred much of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to these 
new courts.31  The Court maintained mandatory appellate jurisdiction over many of 
the cases decided by these courts, but was given discretionary appellate jurisdiction 
over cases otherwise deemed final in these Courts.  This discretionary jurisdiction 
was to be exercised through the use of a writ of certiorari.32   
                                                            
 24 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 10, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 25 Id.; see also FRANKFURTER &  LANDIS, supra note 23, at 13. 
 26 See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011); see also Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1649 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court had no power to pick and choose which cases to decide.”). 
 27 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 10, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Hartnett, supra note 20, 
at 1650; Watts, supra note 26, at 9. 
 28 Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1650; see also Watts, supra note 26, at 7 (“At its inception, 
the Court’s jurisdiction was not discretionary.  Rather, the Court initially stood as a court of 
obligatory jurisdiction that felt it had ‘no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.’” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S. 
264, 404 (1821))). 
 29 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 30 See FRANKFURTER &  LANDIS, supra note 23, at 98-112; see also Mary Garvey Algero, A 
Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of 
Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV. 605, 611 (2003); Watts, supra note 26, 
at 10-11; Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1650 (“[T]he number of cases that the Court was 
obligated to decide grew dramatically after the Civil War . . . By 1888, the Court was more 
than three years behind in its work . . . .”). 
 31 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 32 [T]he Act provided: 
[T]hat in any such case as is hereinbefore made final in the circuit court of appeals it 
shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any 
such case to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review and determination with 
the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of 
error to the Supreme Court. 
Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (1979) 
(quoting Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). This discretionary grant of 
jurisdiction was driven by Congress’s concern about divergent views of law emerging from 
the newly created circuit courts of appeal.  Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1651-56.  See discussion 
infra notes 38-60 and accompanying text. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/4
2012] THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE 565 
 
Congress’s largest expansion of the Supreme Court’s power to dictate its own 
appellate docket came in the Judges’ Bill of 1925.33  Promoted by the justices 
themselves as a way to manage the Court’s growing workload, the bill eliminated 
numerous categories of cases for which Supreme Court review was mandatory and 
instead made these cases reviewable via a writ of certiorari.34  With the passage of 
the Judges’ Bill, the Court effectively “achieved absolute and arbitrary discretion 
over the bulk of its docket.”35  Over the next sixty years, Congress granted more and 
more discretionary jurisdiction to the Court until legislation enacted in 1988 
eliminated all but a handful of cases from the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.36 
B.  The Tie Between Certiorari and Conflict 
With the creation of the nine original circuit courts by the Evarts Act of 1891,37 
came the ability of those courts to be divided on issues and the need to resolve such 
conflicts.38  It was this concern that formed the basis of Congress’ initial grant of 
                                                            
 33 Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (1925). The 1925 Act followed smaller 
expansions of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction that occurred in 1914 and 1916. See 
Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1657-58. 
 34 See Watts, supra note 26, at 13.  Prior to this Act, the Court was required by law to 
review cases involving “suits by the United States, suits based on federal statutes or treaties, 
postal law cases, private antitrust suits, Civil Rights Act damage actions, and commerce law 
suits not covered by the direct review provisions.”  Linzer, supra note 32, at 1240.  For an 
interesting discussion of the politics behind the passage of the Judges’ Bill, see Jeremy 
Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure: An Examination of the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2003) and Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1660-1704. 
 35 Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1705. 
 36 Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman & Stephen M. Shapiro, Epitaph for Mandatory 
Jurisdiction, APPELLATE.NET  (Dec. 1988), http://www.appellate.net/articles/epitaph.asp. 
 37 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 10, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
 38 At one time or another, [for example], 
Courts of appeals have held that 1) under federal law, a bank robber who perpetrates a 
kidnapping while robbing a national bank commits one offense (U.S. v. Faleafine, 
[492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974)]) and commits two offenses (Clark v. U.S., [381 F.2d 230 
(10th Cir. 1960)]); 2) under the Internal Revenue Code, the legal expenses of a 
corporate liquidation are deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense 
(U.S. v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., [365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966)]) and not 
deductible (Lanrao Inc. v. U.S., [422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970)]); and 3) conviction for 
making a threat against the President of the United States requires proof that the 
defendant intended to carry out the threat (U.S. v. Patillo, [431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 
1970)]) and does not require such proof (Watts v. U.S., [402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1968)]).  
As long as they are allowed to stand, such conflicts mean, inter alia, that 
the robber of a national bank is in less jeopardy in one circuit than in 
another; that the United States Tax Court, whose decisions are appealable 
to the Courts of Appeals, would have to grant a deduction in one circuit 
but not in another; and that it is safer to threaten the President in one 
circuit than in another. When it is recognized that such conflicts are 
multiplied many times across the circuits and that they can exist for many 
years, the complexity of the problem is easily appreciated. 
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discretionary jurisdiction to the Court.  Conflicts among the new circuit courts of 
appeals were not desired and Congress sought a mechanism to resolve these 
potential conflicts.  The primary method of resolution of these conflicts was 
certification by the circuit courts of appeals.39  The secondary method of resolution 
was a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Court, ostensibly to be used in 
instances in which the circuit courts of appeals failed to certify.  Defending this dual 
approach, Senator William M. Evarts, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
at the time the Evarts Act was passed, argued, “there should be something besides a 
mere judgment within [the circuit courts of appeals] as to what ought to be reviewed 
in the interest of jurisprudence and uniformity of decision” and that certiorari would 
serve as “another guard against the occurring diversity of judgments” by the circuit 
courts of appeals.40 
As the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction grew, the focus on conflict remained.  As 
they testified before the relevant congressional committees on the bill that would 
eventually become the Judges Act of 1925, the justices repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of conflict in their certiorari decisions—even implying that the presence 
of conflict would lead to a grant of the certiorari petition.  Testifying to the House 
Judiciary Committee in 1922, for example, Chief Justice Taft noted “[w]henever a 
petition for certiorari presents a question on which one circuit court of appeals 
differs from another, then we let the case come into our court as a matter of 
course.”41 
After the enactment of the Judges’ Bill this emphasis found its way into the 
Court’s certiorari practice.  Supreme Court Rule 35(5), adopted in 1925, stated that 
                                                            
Ulmer, supra note 5, at 902 (footnote omitted). 
 39 As passed in the House, the bill (H.R. 9014) required the circuit courts of appeals to 
certify to the Court any “question that had been decided differently in another circuit court.” 
Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1651; see also Linzer, supra note 32, at 1234.  The requirement for 
certification was removed in the Senate substitute that eventually became the Evarts Act of 
1891.  Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1652; Linzer, supra note 32, at 1234-35.  Thus, as enacted, 
the bill merely authorized the circuit courts of appeals, at their discretion, to certify questions 
to the Court.  Linzer, supra note 32, at 1233. 
 40 Linzer, supra note 32, at 1235.  “[C]ertiorari was envisioned as a sort of fallback 
provision should the circuit courts of appeals, prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly careless 
in deciding cases or issuing certificates.”  Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1656. 
 41 Hartnett, supra note 20, at 1665 (quoting Chief Justice Taft).  Echoing Taft’s statement 
in more detail in his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1924, Justice Van 
Devanter explained: 
The inquiry is, first, whether or not the case is one in which a petition for certiorari 
will lie at all; next, whether the questions presented in the case are of wide or public 
importance or concern only the parties to the particular case; next, whether there is 
any conflict between the decision that is complained of and decisions on the same 
question in other circuit courts of appeal or in the Supreme Court; and next, if any of 
the questions determined by the circuit court of appeals be questions of State law, 
whether or not there is a conflict between the decision of that court thereon and the 
decisions of the court of last resort in the State on the same questions. Whenever we 
find such a conflict that, without more, leads to the granting of the petition, if the case 
be one in which a petition for certiorari will lie. 
Id. at 1677 (quoting Justice Van Devanter) (emphasis added).   
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the Court would consider conflicts among the circuit courts of appeals in 
determining whether to exercise its newly granted discretionary jurisdiction.42  
Importantly, and in seeming contrast to the earlier congressional testimony, the new 
rules emphasized the discretionary nature of the writ—even when such a conflict 
was present.43  Since that time, conflict among the courts of appeals has been a stated 
consideration of the Court in deciding whether to exercise its discretionary 
jurisdiction.  Supreme Court Rule 10, the modern day successor to Rule 35(5), 
provides: 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully 
measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the 
Court considers: 
 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with 
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of 
this Court's supervisory power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in 
a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort 
or of a United States court of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled 
by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. 
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error 
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly 
stated rule of law.44 
C.  Conflict, the Uniformity of Federal Law, and the Certiorari Decision 
Although the tie between the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction and conflict first 
occurred in 1891, uniformity of federal law45 has been a priority since the ratification 
of the Constitution.46  “A significant purpose of Article III . . . to permit the Supreme 
                                                            
 42 SUP. CT. R. 35(5), 266 U.S. 645 (1925) (repealed 1939). 
 43 Rule 35(5) provided that “review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
sound judicial discretion,” and that “while neither controlling nor fully measuring the 
[C]ourt’s discretion,” the Court would consider conflict among the circuit courts of appeals in 
making its certiorari decision.  Id.  
 44 SUP. CT. R. 10.  
 45 In contrast, conflict in the interpretation of state law is a natural (and often celebrated) 
by-product of our federal system of government. 
 46 Algero, supra note 30, at 618.  
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Court to unify federal law by reviewing state court decisions of federal questions.”47 
The uniform interpretation of federal law was, in part, the basis for the Court’s 
holding in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee48 that the Court has the power to review and 
overturn a state supreme court’s interpretation of federal law.  The Court stressed 
“the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole 
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution.”49 
The historical concern for uniformity has been viewed as a way to promote 
similar treatment of similarly situated litigants and as way to promote efficiency in 
the legal system.  Conflict “offends the principle that, under one national law, people 
who are similarly situated should be treated similarly.”50  Yet, one of the key 
components of our common law system is to apply the same legal rule to the same or 
similar facts. If federal law means one thing in Pennsylvania and a different thing in 
Kansas, the potential for disparate and potentially unfair treatment arises.  Moreover, 
a “large number of unresolved conflicts impedes the smooth and consistent 
functioning of our justice system.”51  The uncertainty and incoherence of a non-
uniform federal law, however, invited relitigation of previously decided issues, 
“weakens the theory of one national law,” and “attract[s] strategic and inefficient 
litigation.”52   
Given the connection between conflict and the development of the Court’s 
discretionary jurisdiction and the desire for uniform federal law, it stands to reason 
that the Supreme Court would be more likely to grant certiorari to those cases 
presenting a conflict. Available data supports this view.  During the 1983-1985 terms 
of the Court, approximately 45% of the cases heard from the courts of appeals 
involved a conflict.53  That percentage increased to almost 69% during the 1993–
1995 terms,54 and then dropped to approximately 60% during the 2003–2005 terms.55  
In addition, both qualitative56 and quantitative57 research on the Court’s certiorari 
                                                            
 47 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 509 (5th ed. 2003). 
 48 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).  The United States Supreme Court 
reversed a ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court regarding a land ownership dispute.  The 
Virginia Supreme Court refused to adhere to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling.  In 
response, the United States Supreme Court affirmed its power to review state supreme court 
cases. 
 49 Id. at 347-48. 
 50 Shenberg, supra note 7, at 1020-21.  But see Frost, supra note 7, at 1567. 
 51 Baker & MacFarland, supra note 9, at 1407. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
403, 416 (1996). 
 54 Id. 
 55 David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 983 (2007). 
 56 PERRY, supra note 10. 
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behavior highlight the important role of conflict.  Perhaps, then, it is no surprise to 
note that “[a]mong the orthodox justifications for Supreme Court review, the most 
firmly established is the intercircuit conflict.”58 
This information, however, does not paint a complete picture.  The data 
highlights the number of conflict cases the Court resolved, but does not provide 
information on the number of conflict cases the Court left unresolved.  In fact, over 
the past forty years, it is these unresolved conflicts that have been of most concern to 
scholars.59  Existing research confirms the important role of conflict, but does not 
clearly explain why the Court grants certiorari in some conflict cases, but denies 
certiorari in others.  In fact, “departures from the uniformity of law principle have 
become more frequent, as has the Supreme Court’s failure to correct or eliminate 
such conflicts.”60 
Clearly, the existence of conflict positively impacts the Supreme Court’s decision 
to grant certiorari.  But, it remains uncertain how the Court chooses which conflicts 
to resolve and which to ignore.  
III.  STUDYING CERTIORARI BEHAVIOR FROM AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Thus far, we have made clear the extraordinary discretion the Court possesses 
with respect to the certiorari process and the key role conflict plays in that process.  
How the Court exercises its discretion is a question that has fascinated scholars since 
1925.  While the theoretical emphasis has varied between legal61 and extra-legal62 
                                                            
 57 Ulmer, supra note 5; Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and 
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Black & 
Owens, supra note 12, at 1062. 
 58 Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary Inquiry, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 1014 (1985). 
 59 Early treatises on Supreme Court jurisdiction suggested that, in the presence of conflict, 
the Court granted certiorari as a matter of course.  Stern, supra note 8, at 465.  As the Supreme 
Court’s caseload increased over time, however, the Court’s ability to resolve [grant certiorari 
to] all cases presenting conflict dwindled.  Baker & MacFarland, supra note 9, at 1407.  By 
the mid-1970s, two different national commissions had recommended the formation of a 
National Court of Appeals with the authority to resolve intercircuit conflicts.  For a summary 
of these proposals, as well as other historical proposals designed to promote the uniformity of 
federal law, see Algero, supra note 30, at 623-34.  Writing in 1984, then Associate Justice 
William H. Rehnquist opined that: 
[t]he Court cannot review a sufficiently significant portion of the decisions of any 
federal court of appeals to maintain the supervisory authority that it maintained over 
the federal courts fifty years ago; it simply is not able or willing, given the other 
constraints upon its time, to review all the decisions that result in a conflict in the 
applicability of federal law. 
Willliam H. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently 
Experienced by the Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
 60 Ulmer, supra note 5, at 911. 
 61 The legal model asserts that, “in one form or another, [judicial behavior is] substantially 
influenced by the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the 
Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and/or precedent.”  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 48 (2002).   
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explanations of judicial behavior, two general answers to this question have been 
offered—one focusing on cues readily available to the Court, the other focusing on 
ideological disagreement between the Court and the lower court that issued the 
decision being considered for review. 
A.  The Development of Cue Theory 
Early studies attempted to trace, without much success, the Court’s application of 
its own rules for exercising its discretion.63  Although the rules claimed to highlight 
the factors the Court would consider in making its certiorari decision, there were 
“[d]isturbing instances . . . in which the Court’s action in granting certiorari appears 
irreconcilable either with its own professed grounds or with any general canons 
which can independently be formulated.”64  Indeed, it appeared that the Court’s own 
rules provided “no standard whatsoever” to its certiorari decisions.65  Convinced that 
the Court’s rules (including those focusing on conflict) offered little explanation for 
its behavior, scholars began to test other explanations of the Court’s certiorari 
decision. 
Cue theory, developed in 1963 by political scientist Joseph Tanenhaus and his 
colleagues, was one of the first attempts to generate a more complete picture of the 
Court’s certiorari behavior.66  Given the assumption that justices can give each 
certiorari petition no more than an initial cursory review, justices need a quick and 
efficient method to help them separate frivolous from non-frivolous certiorari 
petitions.67  The non-frivolous petitions would not necessarily be granted review, but 
they would be set aside for more “careful study.”68  Thus, under cue theory, certiorari 
petitions contain “readily identifiable cues” to enable a justice to perform the initial 
cursory review; petitions devoid of cues could be ignored and denied review, while 
petitions containing cues could be set aside for further review.69  Relevant cues 
                                                            
 62 Extra-legal models of judicial behavior emphasize the role of ideological attitudes (i.e. 
preferences over policy) and values.  Judicial behavior “can be explained primarily as 
expressions of their personal policy preferences, with little or no role for law, legal reasoning, 
or legal doctrine.” Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical 
Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 81 (2010). 
 63 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at 
October Term, 1933, 48 HARV. L. REV. 238, 275-76 (1934) (evaluating certiorari grants and 
denials from the 1933 term, and advocating that the Court issue opinions explaining its 
certiorari decisions to “render[] the grounds of its action discoverable and predictable” and 
“[to] make familiar the canons which guide the Court”); Fowler V. Harper & Arnold 
Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court did not do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 427 
(1954). 
 64 Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 63, at 276.  
 65 Harper & Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 456. 
 66 Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111 (Glendon A. Schubert ed., 1963). 
 67 Stuart H. Teger & Douglas Kosinski, The Cue Theory of Supreme Court Certiorari 
Jurisdiction: A Reconsideration, 42 J. POL. 834, 835 (1980). 
 68 Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, at 118. 
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included the parties to the case (specifically the federal government as a party), 
dissension in the case under review (specifically among the judges of the lower court 
or between two or more courts or administrative agencies in the same case), and the 
issue raised by the case (specifically civil liberties or economic issues).70  Data 
analysis found support for the influence of all of these cues except for economic 
issues.71 
As originally envisioned, the purpose of cue theory was to move beyond a study 
of the legal rules the Court purported to use in its certiorari process.72  Later scholars 
disagreed with this approach and began to reincorporate the Court’s rules into their 
analysis of the Court’s certiorari behavior, arguing that factors like conflict were too 
important to ignore.  The first systematic effort to this end was undertaken by 
political scientist S. Sidney Ulmer in the early 1980s.73  Ulmer examined a sample of 
certiorari petitions during the 1947-1976 terms of the Court (encompassing all or 
part of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts) and coded these petitions for the 
presence of traditional cues identified by cue theory, as well as the presence of 
conflict.  To determine whether conflict was present, Ulmer identified the cases in 
his sample in which a conflict was claimed to exist and independently evaluated the 
cases cited therein in order to determine whether the claimed conflict was genuine.74  
Statistical analysis confirmed that “conflict is far and away the most significant 
predictor of certiorari decisions” for two of the three Courts evaluated.75  Ultimately, 
Ulmer concluded that “[t]he Court is significantly responsive to the legal-systemic 
                                                            
 69 Id.  But see Teger & Kosinski, supra, note 67 at 845 (questioning the validity of the cue 
theory, noting that it “ends up saying [merely] that the Justices tend to accept cases that they 
think are important”); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Deny or Grant Certiorari: Further 
Consideration of Cue Theory, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637, 642 (1972) (noting that “our analysis 
led us to reject two of the three cues suggested by earlier work” and suggesting that “[a] 
search for and the testing of additional cues now seems in order”). 
 70 Tanenhaus et al., supra, note 66 at 122-27; see also PERRY, supra, note 10, at 114-16. 
 71 Tanenhaus et al., supra, note 66, at 122-27. And even economic issues “didn’t do too 
badly” as a cue.  Teger & Kosinski, supra note 67, at 837; see also Virginia C. Armstrong & 
Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the Warren & Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory 
Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141 (1982) (applying cue theory to the Warren Court and the Burger 
Court). 
 72 Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, at 114-16.  
 73 S. Sidney Ulmer, Conflict with Supreme Court Precedent and the Granting of Plenary 
Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474-75 (1983); accord Ulmer, supra note 5, at 903 (“I wish to know 
not just how many conflict cases are granted or denied certiorari, but whether such decisions 
are associated with the presence and absence of the conflict condition.”). 
 74 See Ulmer, supra note 5, at 904-05. 
 75 Ulmer’s results varied significantly across the three Courts he studied. For the Vinson 
and Warren Courts, the presence of conflict explained from four to eight times as much of the 
variance in the decision to grant or deny certiorari as did cues such as federal government as a 
party or the presence of either a civil liberties or economic issue. For the Burger Court, 
however, the presence of the federal government as a party explained as much (in all cases of 
conflict) or more (in cases of intercircuit conflict only) of the variance in the certiorari 
decision as did the presence of conflict.  Id. at 908-10. 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
572 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:559 
 
variable—conflict—and less governed by case issue variables than one might have 
thought.”76 
More recent research is consistent with this conclusion, finding that “[w]henever 
actual conflict was present, the likelihood that certiorari was granted jumped 
dramatically.77  Thus, in a study of the Court’s 1982 term certiorari behavior, the 
presence of a conflict78 had a statistically significant effect on the Court’s cert 
decision, increasing the chances of a cert grant by 33%.79  Interviews with Supreme 
Court justices and former clerks have suggested that conflict among the federal 
courts of appeals is perhaps the “single most important” factor in a justice’s 
certiorari decision.80 
B.  A Focus on Ideology 
Despite the relative success of cue theory in explaining the Court’s certiorari 
behavior, dissatisfaction with its ability to accurately predict the Court’s appellate 
docket remained.81  While some of this dissatisfaction was due to the fact that cue 
theory did not actually predict which cases would be granted certiorari,82 much of it 
was due to cue theory’s failure to consider other potentially significant influences on 
judicial behavior.  Among most important of these considerations was impact of 
ideology. 
At its simplest level, a role for ideology can be found in what scholars have 
labeled error-correction strategy.  “[P]olicy motivated judges . . . vote to grant 
certiorari whenever a lower court decision depart[s] significantly from their 
preferred doctrinal position.”83  Justices following this strategy will examine 
petitions to determine if the lower court issued a decision in contrast with the 
justice’s personal policy preferences.84  Thus, a conservative justice will be more 
likely to vote to grant certiorari to cases decided liberally below; a liberal justice will 
                                                            
 76 Id. at 910. 
 77 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988). 
 78 For this study, the researchers broadly defined conflict to mean conflict between state 
supreme courts, between federal courts of appeals, between a lower court and Supreme Court 
precedent, or between a state court and a federal court.   Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 
1117. 
 79 Id. at 1121. 
 80 PERRY, supra note 10. 
 81 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 1115. 
 82 The initial tests of cue theory focused only on behavior of the Court in its decision to 
grant or deny certiorari. Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, 119-20.  But this is only an indirect 
test of the theory.  A direct test of cue theory would require observation of an individual 
justice’s initial review of certiorari (i.e. the separation of frivolous from non-frivolous 
petitions).  Short of that, the indirect test of cue theory suggests that cases devoid of cues will 
not be granted certiorari; cases containing cues may or may not be granted certiorari.  Teger & 
Kosinski, supra note 67, at 836. 
 83 Donald R. Songer, Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions 
on Certiorari, 41 J. POL. 1185, 1187 (1979). 
 84 Id. at 1188. 
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be more likely to vote to grant certiorari to cases decided conservatively below.85  In 
that way, the “ideological direction of the lower court decision may be an error or 
policy ‘cue’ and the Supreme Court may use the occasion to counter a decision of 
which is disapproves ideologically.”86 
The underlying concern behind an error-correction strategy is the existing status 
quo policy reflected in the lower court’s opinion.  Because of the time and resources 
that must be devoted to those cases in which certiorari is granted, justices are more 
concerned with reversing “incorrect” decisions below, than with affirming “correct” 
decision below.  In granting certiorari to those cases decided “incorrectly” below, the 
justice is given the opportunity to vote to reverse the lower court decision, thereby 
issuing a decision in congruence with his or her policy preferences.  In denying 
certiorari to those cases decided “correctly” below (thereby letting stand the lower 
court decision), the justice’s preferred policy position is reflected in the lower court 
opinion. 
This simple hypothesis has been tested in a variety of ways—with the focus 
being on both individual justice behavior and aggregate Court behavior.  Two 
themes emerge from this research—consistent support for the error-correction 
hypothesis and increasing sophistication in testing it.  Many initial studies examined 
the effect of policy at the aggregate level, with scholars studying periods or terms of 
the Court in which it could be labeled “conservative” or “liberal.”  The policy cue 
was deemed to be present when a liberal court, granted certiorari to a case decided 
conservatively below, and vice versa.87  More recent studies have focused on 
individual justice behavior and on a comparison of the status quo policy established 
by the lower court decision and the likely policy that would be established by a 
decision from the Court.  Data supports the conclusion that justices whose preferred 
ideological position is closer to the likely outcome from the Court are thus more 
likely to vote to grant certiorari, believing that the Court’s final decision will more 
closely resemble their personal policy preferences than the existing state of the law.88 
IV.  A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT  
As the discussion above highlights, conflict and ideology have become necessary 
components in the analysis of the Court’s certiorari behavior.  To this point, 
however, they have been treated as competing explanations.89  Conflict has been 
viewed as representing the effect of law on certiorari behavior; ideology has been 
viewed as representing the effect of policy preferences on certiorari behavior.90  
More generally, the ability of conflict to explain certiorari behavior has been used to 
                                                            
 85 Id. at 1188-89.  The 1982 Supreme Court, for example, had a “decided, but certainly not 
extreme, conservative ideological orientation.”  Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 1120. 
One study concluded that “[o]ther things being equal, the [1982] Court [was] significantly 
more likely to hear cases that were decided liberally in the court immediately below.”  Id. 
 86 Armstrong & Johnson, supra note 71, at 147. 
 87 Songer, supra note 83, at 1185. 
 88 Black & Owens, supra note 12, at 1062. 
 89 But see id. at 1070 (arguing that the presence of conflict can both empower and 
constrain justices seeking to effectuate policy goals). 
    90 Id. 
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validate legal models of judicial behavior while the ability of ideology to explain 
certiorari behavior has been used to validate extra-legal models of judicial behavior. 
That this law-based approach to conflict has been taken is not surprising.  Both 
the Court’s own rules and the legal system’s concern for uniformity point to the 
importance of conflict.  In taking this legal view of conflict, the focus of much of this 
work has been on whether the conflict is real and genuine or merely alleged.91  Once 
a conflict is determined to be real, each conflict is treated exactly the same as any 
other conflict.  Such an approach allows the presence of a correlation between 
conflict and certiorari grants to substitute itself for a full understanding of the 
mechanism, the reason, by which conflict influences certiorari behavior. This 
approach adopts the view that the explanation for this correlation must be the 
adjudication of law and fails to consider any other potential alternatives. Yet, 
potential alternatives exist.  
As the cases involving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act make 
clear,92 the correlation between conflict and certiorari grants may indicate that 
conflict can be about the resolution of competing views over policy.  A conflict 
among the lower courts may in fact be a cue to the Court that the lower courts 
disagree about the underlying policy aspects of their decisions.93  And perhaps the 
political ideology of the opposing views in the conflict, as compared to the ideology 
of the Court itself, affects the Supreme Court’s decision to hear a particular case. 
Take, for example, the competing policy positions presented to the Court in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.94 Harris raised competing views over the proper 
standard for determining when a hostile or abusive work environment constituted a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95  The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, along with the Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Federal 
Circuits, required an employee to show a serious effect on his or her psychological 
well-being or suffer injury in order to bring a hostile work environment claim.96  
This side of the conflict represents a “conservative” position, in the sense that the 
standard adopted made it harder for the employee’s claim against the employer to be 
successful.  In contract, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the Sixth 
Circuit requirement and mandated that an employee need only show that a 
reasonable person of the same gender as the employee would consider the conduct to 
be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create 
an abusive working environment.”97  The Ninth Circuit, thus, took a “liberal” 
approach to this issue, because its standard made it easier for the employee’s claim 
                                                            
 91 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 77, at 1116-17; Ulmer, supra note 5, at 904-06.   
 92 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.   
 93 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 7, at 1591 (“When presented with ambiguous federal law, 
judges in the Fourth Circuit will often adopt the more politically conservative reading and the 
judges in the First and Ninth Circuits the more liberal one.”).  
 94 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 95 Id. at 18-19. 
 96 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Vance v. S. Bell 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989); Downes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 775 
F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 97 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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against the employer to be successful.  In short, Harris provides a clear example of 
two competing ideological “sides” in conflict. 
Clearly, not all conflict is about policy.98 Similarly, however, not all conflict is 
about law. When it comes to conflict, policy and law are not completely separate (the 
traditional view) or completely overlapping explanations. Rather, they partially 
overlap. Unless scholars understand how this overlap affects Court behavior, 
inferences about the effects of both policy and law on certiorari behavior may be 
incorrect. 
A.  Hypotheses:  Political Ideology in Cases Presenting Conflict 
Perhaps, given the role ideology plays in the certiorari process in general, 
conflict also provide an opportunity for justices to act on their individual ideological 
preferences in evaluating certiorari petitions.  Do all conflict cases raise such clear 
partisan implications?  Of course not.  But, we argue, certainly others do.  
Two simple hypotheses serve as the starting point to test this argument.  Both 
hypotheses rely on assigning an ideological value to the Supreme Court as a whole 
and to both “sides” of a conflict,99 and then comparing the relative political position 
of those three entities. 
The first hypothesis focuses on the ideological distance between the two 
competing “sides” of the conflict—specifically, how far apart, politically, are the 
two sides of the conflict represented in a cert petition.  If the Court is concerned 
about the policy implications of the conflicts that it reviews, we would expect it to 
review those conflicts where the opposing policy positions are widely divergent—in 
other words, where the two sides of the conflict are far apart on the spectrum of 
ideological positions.  Thus, we hypothesize that as the distance between the 
political positions of the two sides of the conflict increases, the Court will be more 
likely to grant certiorari. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the distance between the Court and “side” of 
the conflict that is furthest from it.  If the Court is concerned about the policy 
implications of the conflicts that it reviews, we would expect it to review those 
conflicts in which one of the sides represents an outcome that is far from the Court’s 
preferred policy.  In other words, if one side of the conflict is ideologically very far 
from the Court’s preferred policy position, then we would expect the Court to grant 
certiorari to bring the overall state of law closer to its own ideological preferences.  
Thus, we hypothesize that as the distance between the Court and the side that is 
furthest from it increases, the Court will be more likely to grant certiorari.  
B.  Empirical Testing  
To test these hypotheses, we reviewed cases that came before the Supreme Court 
during the 1986–1994 terms.  We chose these years specifically because of the 
availability of cert pool memoranda,100 which were recently released to the public in 
                                                            
 98 See, e.g., Tanenhaus et al., supra note 66, at 118 (discussing “trivial” conflicts). 
 99 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2. 
 100 The “cert pool” is an aggregation of the justices’ clerks charged with reviewing 
petitions for a writ of certiorari. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. opted out of the cert pool process, 
as did Justice John Paul Stevens before him. Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a 
Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A21.  When a petition for 
a writ of certiorari is filed with the Court, it is randomly assigned to one of these clerks for 
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the Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun.101  Our basic 
approach is as follows: we identified cases that presented to the Court a certiorari 
petition that alleged a conflict and we assigned an ideological “score” to each side of 
the conflict and to the Supreme Court itself.  Using statistical analysis, then, we were 
then able to compare these ideological scores to test each of our hypotheses. 
1.  Data 
Our data consist of cases in which a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with 
the Court and which present a conflict among the federal courts of appeals.102  For 
conflict cases in which the Court granted certiorari, our data consist of a random 
sample of ninety-four cases, out of a possible 296 cases, initially brought to the 
Court during the 1986–1994 terms in which the Court indicated in its opinion that it 
had granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict.103  From the Supreme Court 
opinions in these granted cases, we identified each of the courts of appeals cases that 
the Court cited in its reasons from granting certiorari as being in conflict, and we 
noted which “side” of the conflict each court of appeals case represented.  In Harris, 
for example, the Court’s opinion explicitly states: 
We granted certiorari . . . to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on 
whether conduct, to be actionable as “abusive work environment” 
harassment . . . must “seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-
being” or lead the plaintiff to “suffe[r] injury.” Compare Rabidue 
(requiring serious effect on psychological well-being); Vance v. Southern 
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 ([11th Cir.] 1989) 
(same); and Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same), 
with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-878 ([9th Cir.] 1991) (rejecting 
such a requirement).104 
                                                            
review.  The clerk writes a memorandum offering a recommended course of action for the 
Court and then circulates that memorandum to the chambers of the justices participating in the 
cert pool.  Watts, supra note 26, at 15; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the 
Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517, 520 (2003); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 
SUPREME COURT 232-33 (Knopf ed., 2001); Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1226-27 
(detailing the cert pool further). 
 101 Lee Epstein et al., Digital Archive of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://epstein.usc.edu/blackmun.php; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and 
Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 
934 (2009). 
 102 We ignored cases presenting conflicts with state courts because we lack the necessary 
information on state court judge ideology to conduct our analysis. 
 103 We recognize the limitation in relying only on whether the Court states that it granted 
cert to resolve a conflict.  This approach potentially undercounts the number of conflicts 
actually resolved by the Court. In future research, we plan to use the cert pool memoranda 
provided in the archives of Justice Blackmun’s papers to more completely identify this 
population since the cert pool memorandum typically indicates if a conflict is present. 
 104 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).   
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From this language, we identified one side of the conflict as consisting of the 
Sixth Circuit (the Rabidue case), the Eleventh Circuit, and the Federal Circuit.  The 
Ninth Circuit represents the other side of the conflict. 
For conflict cases in which the Court denied certiorari, our data consist of a 
sample of thirty-nine cases, out of a possible 295 cases, initially brought to the Court 
during the 1986–1993 terms in which Justice White indicated his dissent from the 
denial of certiorari.105  For these denied cases, we reviewed the cert pool 
memorandum to identify which courts of appeals the memo cited as being in conflict 
and which side of the conflict those cases represent. 
We then collected information from the lower court opinions, including 
information on the identity and votes of the judges involved and the lower court’s 
disposition of the case. In some instances this process resulted in coding, or 
gathering data from, two lower court opinions (i.e. the Court or cert pool memo 
merely noted that lower court opinion A conflicts with lower court opinion B); in 
some instances this resulted in the coding of thirteen lower court opinions (i.e. the 
Court or the cert pool memo cited opinions from each of the thirteen courts of 
appeals reflecting the conflict).106  In total, for the certiorari granted cases, we coded 
information from 374 courts of appeals cases, an average of 3.98 lower court cases 
for each Supreme Court opinion; for the certiorari denied cases, we coded 
information from 165 courts of appeals cases, an average of 4.23 lower court cases 
for each cert pool memorandum.  
2.  Ideology Score 
To examine conflict as an ideological variable, we need some measure of where a 
particular “side” from a given case sits in policy space relative to the other “side.”  If 
we can think of lower court cases as presenting, as Harris demonstrates,107 
competing “sides” of a policy debate, then we can begin to identify where the rule of 
law adopted by each of these lower courts is located by examining the side of the 
conflict on which each court sits.  
As noted above, in reviewing Supreme Court opinions and cert pool memoranda, 
we recorded which side of the conflict the Court or the cert pool memo indicated 
each lower court opinion represented. Such a statement from the Court and the cert 
pool memo is typical in conflict cases. In granted cases, the final opinion from the 
Court not only provides citations to the lower court opinions in conflict, but also 
clearly identifies which lower courts it thinks are in agreement or disagreement with 
one another.108  In denied cases, a careful reading of the cert pool memorandum 
delineates which lower courts the clerk thinks are in agreement or disagreement with 
each other. 
                                                            
 105 We adopt this approach because of Justice White’s focus, throughout his tenure on the 
Court, on conflicts among the courts of appeals.  See Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1269-
70. Thus, of all the justices, Justice White was most often prone to issue dissents from the 
denial of certiorari due to his view that a conflict existed which the Court was refusing to 
resolve.  See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of 
Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 705 (1995). 
 106 We ignored any citations to state supreme court cases. 
 107 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.  
 108 See, e.g., infra note 109 and accompanying text (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17 (1993)). 
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To develop a measure of the ideological position of each side, we assumed a one-
dimensional liberal-conservative (left-right) spectrum.  Obviously, we cannot simply 
assign each lower court opinion a location on this left-right dimension. Instead, our 
measure of the location on the spectrum was derived from the Judicial Common 
Space (JCS)109 methodology.  The JCS places justices of the Supreme Court110 and 
judges of the courts of appeals111 on the same one-dimensional, liberal-conservative 
scale.112  The scores range from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative),113 and “[t]he result is 
a score that can be compared directly across institutions and over time.”114  Thus, 
“[e]mpirical legal scholars have employed these scores across the board.”115 
For the lower court opinions, we assigned to each opinion an ideology score 
equal to the JCS score of the judge who authored the opinion. Although courts of 
appeals cases typically are decided in three-judge panels, we use the authoring 
judge’s JCS score for a couple of reasons.  First, this judge typically retains the most 
control over the content of the lower court’s opinion. Moreover, viewed from the 
Supreme Court’s perspective, it is the identity of the authoring judge that most 
quickly and efficiently provides a cue for the justices reviewing the lower 
decision.116   
In situations where the Supreme Court or cert pool memo cited only one lower 
court case as representing a particular side of a conflict, the location on the 
ideological spectrum of that side is represented by the JCS score of the judge who 
authored the cited lower court opinion.  In situations where the Supreme Court or 
cert pool memo cited more than one lower court case as representing a particular 
                                                            
 109 See generally Lee Epstein et al, The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 
(2007) (introducing the Judicial Common Space measurement scale). 
 110 Supreme Court justices are assigned a JCS score based on “a vote-based measure of 
Supreme Court ideology developed by [political scientists Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. 
Quinn in 2002].”  Id. at 306; see also id. at 307 (“These ‘Martin-Quinn’ scores, which are 
available for all justices in all terms from 1937 to 2003 . . . are derived from voting patterns on 
the Supreme Court.”) . 
 111 JSC scores for courts of appeals judges are based on the notion of “senatorial courtesy.”  
If a judge is appointed from a state where the President and at least one home-state 
Senator are of the same party, the nominee is assigned the . . . score of the home-state 
Senator (or the average of the home-state Senators if both members of the delegation 
are from the President’s party).  If neither home-state Senator is of the President’s 
party, the nominee receives the . . . score of the appointing President. 
Id. at 306. 
 112 Similar common space scores are also available for presidents and members of 
Congress.  Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1273. 
 113 Epstein et al., supra note 109, at 309-10. 
 114 Owens & Simon, supra note 14, at 1274. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a 
Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 109-10 (2000). 
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side of a conflict, the location of that side is represented by the mean JCS score of all 
of the judges authoring the cited lower court opinions. 
For the Supreme Court’s ideological position, we use the JCS score of the 
median justice on the Court in the prior term.  Thus, taken together, we have 
measures of the Court median and the two “sides” of the conflict for 133 conflicts 
cases that were brought to the Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari.  And all of 
these measures—the scores for the Court and the sides of the conflict—are on the 
same JCS scale, enabling direct comparison among them.  
 
Figure 1: Ideological Position of Circuits and Supreme Court, Conflict Cases. 
 
 
Figure 1 displays these measures for the first forty of the ninety-four conflict 
cases in which certiorari was granted and all of the thirty-nine conflict cases for 
which certiorari was denied.  The vertical line on each dotted horizontal line 
represents the Supreme Court’s LCS score, its ideological position on a -1 to 1 scale, 
based on the median justice of the prior term.  The squares mark the JCS score of the 
more liberal side of the circuit split, and the triangle denotes the JCS score of the 
more conservative side, both calculated as an average of the JCS scores of the 
authoring judges of opinion on that side of the split.  
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C.  Analysis and Discussion of Hypothesis One 
Recall that our first hypothesis focused on how far apart, ideologically, the two 
sides of a conflict were.   We suggested that if the Court were concerned about 
conflict from a policy standpoint, it would be more likely to grant certiorari as the 
distance between the policy positions of the two sides of the conflict increased.  
Figure 2 shows the results of our tests for this first hypothesis. 
Figure 2: Ideological Distance Between Circuit Split Sides. 
 
 
Figure 2 includes three separate histograms, each indicating the number of 
certiorari petitions the court received based on the ideological distance between the 
sides of the circuit split.  The horizontal axis of each histogram is the distance 
between the ideological score of the two sides of the conflict, and the vertical axis is 
a count of how many petitions included a conflict with that divide. 
The top histogram shows the distribution between the two sides to the conflict for 
all of the cases in our data set.  The middle histogram shows the same distribution 
for the cases where the Court granted certiorari.  And the bottom histogram shows 
the distribution between the sides of the conflict in cases where the Court denied 
certiorari.  The thick vertical line represents the mean distance between sides of the 
conflict for each category. 
There is a marked difference between the shapes of the distributions for the 
granted and denied conflicts, which supports our hypothesis.  As the distance 
between the sides of the conflict increases (approaches 1), the Court is more likely to 
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grant certiorari.  The bottom histogram of denied petitions shows far fewer cases 
with a wider split than the granted cases.  Conversely, the denied petitions include 
far more cases with a narrow split—a smaller ideological difference between the two 
sides of the conflict.  Moreover, the mean distance between the sides of the granted 
conflicts (0.361) is greater than the mean distance (0.280) between the sides of the 
denied conflicts, a difference that is statistically significant.117 
D.  Analysis and Discussion of Hypothesis Two 
Our second hypothesis focused on the position of the Court relative to the sides 
of the conflict.  Specifically, we suggested that if the Court were concerned about 
conflict from a policy standpoint, it would be more likely to grant certiorari as the 
distance between the Court and one side of the conflict increased.  Figure 3 shows 
the results of our tests for this second hypothesis. 
 
Figure 3: Maximum Distance Between Circuit Split Side and Supreme Court. 
 
 
  
Figure 3 includes three separate histograms, each showing the number of cert 
petitions the Court received based on the distance between the Court and the side of 
                                                            
 117 A simple one-tailed t-test indicates that this difference is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level (p=0.039). 
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the conflict that is farthest from it.  The horizontal axis of each histogram is the 
distance between the ideological score of the Court and the side of the conflict that is 
farthest from it, and the vertical axis is a count of how many petitions included a 
distance of that magnitude. 
The top histogram shows the distribution between the Court and the “side” of the 
conflict that is the farthest from it for all the conflicts in our data.  The middle and 
bottom histograms show that the distribution of this distance for granted and denied 
cases.  And again, the thick vertical line is the mean distance for each category of 
petitions.  
Once again, there is a difference between the shapes of the distributions for the 
granted and denied conflicts, but the difference is less dramatic.  Granted conflicts 
appear to more often reflect a greater distance between the Court and the far side of 
the conflict; granted conflicts include far more petitions where the distance 
approaches 1.  Moreover, the mean distance between the Court and the far side of the 
conflict in granted conflicts (0.369) is greater than the mean distance (0.326) 
between the Court and the far side of the conflict in denied conflicts.  The difference 
between these two means is markedly smaller than in the analysis for the first 
hypothesis, and this difference fails to achieve statistically significant.118 
E.  Discussion of Empirical Analyses 
The analysis presented in this study sheds new light on the role lower court 
conflict plays in influencing the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions.  Conflict has 
long been recognized as being important in the certiorari process, but the above 
analysis shows that it is more important to Court decision-making than has been 
previously recognized.  This study provides evidence that the ideological content of 
lower court conflict provides informational clues to justices that influence their 
decisions to grant certiorari, which is particularly important as the Court works it 
way through the thousands of certiorari petitions it receives each year.  The data 
show that the ideologies of lower court justices can influence Supreme Court 
certiorari decision.   
Consistent with hypothesis one, when the justices on the two sides of a circuit 
split have distinct ideological differences, cases are more likely to be heard by the 
Court.  The differences in lower court ideologies are significantly higher in the cases 
granted cert than in the cases denied cert.  This phenomenon indicates that the Court 
is using what it knows about the ideologies of lower court justices to help it identify 
cases where the conflict in the law is the greatest and where resolution by the 
Supreme Court is the most needed.  Cases that show stark ideological difference 
between the sides of a split are likely to represent areas of the law where current law 
is the most unsettled and where the greatest policy difference between circuits are 
likely to lie.  The ideological content of conflict cases provides the Supreme Court 
with a useful informational tool that allows justices to identify the conflict cases that 
most need the Court’s attention. 
Hypothesis two argues that the ideological content of conflict cases provides the 
Supreme Court with a way to identify cases where the lower courts are issuing 
rulings that are the farthest away from the Supreme Court’s ideological preferences.  
This allows the Court to identify and then correct “errors” made by lower courts.  
                                                            
 118 A simple one-tailed t-test indicates that this difference is not statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level (p=0.067).  
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/4
2012] THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE 583 
 
The empirical evidence provides only the weakest of support for this hypothesis.  
While cases where the ideological differences between the Supreme Court and at 
least one side of a conflict are highest are slightly more likely to be granted 
certiorari, the effect is small.   The Court may occasionally consider its policy 
preferences relative to those of lower court preferences when accepting cases for 
review, but the Court does not appear to be doing so consistently.  These results, 
taken together, indicate that the Court is using the ideological information about 
lower court justices to help identify the conflict cases most in need of resolution, but 
is not consistently using this information to further its own policy preferences. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
In this Article, we argued in favor of an examination of the long-held assumption 
in the literature on the Court’s certiorari behavior that conflict in the lower courts is a 
purely legal concept and nothing else. Clearly, case examples exist that demonstrate 
the need for this examination. In some cases, like Harris and the recent case 
involving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, conflict appears to be 
about more than just a dispute over the proper legal rule to be applied to a given set 
of facts.  Our results, though limited in nature by the number of cases from which we 
collected data, indicate some support for our hypotheses. 
Future research and statistical analysis can only enhance this conversation.  Does, 
for example, the depth or strength of the conflict in terms of the number of courts of 
appeals having issued the decision affect the likelihood of the Court’s grant of 
certiorari?  We hope to continue to explore this and other questions with additional 
data collection and continued research and analysis.  
 
 
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
584 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:559 
 
 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/4
